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CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: IS A
SPECIALIZED COURT THE SOLUTION?
Darcey J. Goelz†
Abstract: China’s economic growth has come at a high price: environmental and
natural resource destruction. Presently, China’s legal system is not prepared to protect
China’s environmental resources. China’s State Council has expressed an interest in
establishing a civil and administrative system to manage environmental matters. Some of
the objectives expressed by the State Council could be achieved by creating a special
tribunal to address environmental issues, similar to New Zealand’s Environment Court.
A specialized court promotes environmental protection, and specialization creates experts
in a specific field, allowing for consistency among decisions. An environmental court
will fit into China’s current legal system because Chinese law expressly authorizes
specialized courts. In fact, China already has specialized courts, including special
maritime courts. The creation of a specialized court would not be a panacea for China’s
environmental problems, but it is a fundamental first step.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Environmental pollution in China is a profoundly urgent concern—
and for good reason. China is faced with severe environmental challenges
that must be met in order to prevent the destruction of the forests, the
extinction of species,1 the loss of land to desert, and the disappearance of
potable water.2 The impact of environmental damage is not limited to the
environment; it also affects the people that live there. China’s lack of legal
environmental protection results in toxic living conditions and leaves
environmental advocates without tools to protect the environment and
themselves. For instance, some citizens wear gas masks to get to work,3
while other citizens are arrested for photographing illegal chemical
discharges.4 In the time leading up to the Beijing Olympics, China’s
environmental problems steadily rose to the forefront of the world’s
†
I am indebted to many, but I must first thank my dad—for his guidance and assistance with drafts
of this and many other papers over the years—and my mom—for providing her loving support and calm.
To each of my editors, you have been a life-saver and I could not begin to thank you enough. Finally, I
must thank Professor Dongsheng Zang for his remarks on this comment and our intriguing conversations
over the year.
1
See Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part VI, China’s Turtles, Emblems of a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2007.
2
See Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part II, Beneath Booming Cities, China’s Future is Drying
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007 [hereinafter Yardley, Part II].
3
See Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part X, Beijing’s Olympic Quest: Turn Smoggy Sky Blue,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007.
4
See Joseph Kahn, Choking on Growth: Part III, In China, a Lake’s Champion Imperils Himself,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007.
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attention. These environmental problems are due primarily to the country’s
rapid economic development, but the country’s tumultuous history and
problems of corruption are also factors. Seemingly at odds with its
environmental record, China has an extensive framework of progressive
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Unfortunately, these laws are
often not implemented or enforced.5 China’s government recognizes the
need to reform its legal system to address environmental challenges.6
China has the potential to protect and restore the country’s natural
environment. To do so, China’s leaders must strengthen the institutions
responsible for environmental protection and the “necessary adjunct
institutions such as the judiciary.”7 Of the many possible approaches to
addressing the environmental crisis in China, the Chinese government
appears willing to embrace a specialized environmental court. In 2005, the
State Council8 issued a decision regarding environmental protection.9 One
of the provisions in the decision implicitly suggests the country harbors a
desire to establish a specialized forum for environmental actions.10 This
5

See Richard J. Ferris, Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China’s Continuing
Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 569, 589, 594601 (2003). The State Council asserted that “the environmental protection legal system is not
complete . . . and where laws exist they are not followed and enforcement is not strict.” State Council,
Decision in Relation to Materializing Scientific Development Vision for the Strengthening of
Environmental Protection, No. 39 of 2005 (Dec. 3, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter State Council Decision],
translated in part in 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 201 (2006-2007). However, the author of this article translated
the name of the Decision as the “Decision on Implementation of Scientific Development and Strengthening
on Environmental Protection.” Alex Wang¸ The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China:
Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 201 (2006-2007).
6
Wang¸ supra note 5, at 197.
7
See ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO
CHINA’S FUTURE 92 (2004) [hereinafter ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK].
8
The State Council is China’s highest executive and state administrative body. Wang¸ supra note
5, at 197. The State Council produces many of the country’s rules and regulations, and its objectives
should not be easily dismissed. Still, by no means does the State Council’s proclamation mean that any
perceptible change will occur; the Chinese government has been criticized for rhetoric that does not result
in any substantive change. See China: Attacks on Media Violate Olympic Commitments, HUMAN RIGHTS
NEWS, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/08/07/china16552.htm (last visited April 18,
2008) (criticizing empty rhetoric about preventing obstruction of foreign journalists for the Olympic
Games); Ke Zhang, China to Hold Provincial Officials Accountable for Environmental Harm, CHINA
ENVIRONMENTAL
NEWS
DIGEST,
Feb.
22,
2007,
http://china-environmentalnews.blogspot.com/2007/02/china-to-hold-provincial-officials.html (last visited March 26, 2008) (almost
half of the investment pledged to prevent environmental pollution was never provided). See generally W.
Scott Railton, Comment, The Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Protection in China, 7 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 859 (1998) (stating that water pollution control measures will be mere rhetoric unless action is
taken).
9
State Council Decision, translated in Shun Yong Yeh, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 399 (2007).
10
Nothing in the State Council Decision expressly states a desire to create a specialized court, but
the Decision does imply that changes to the judicial system are a necessary step towards a healthier, cleaner
environment. See Shun Yong Yeh, Is China’s Development Path Sustainable? An Overview on the Legal
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Comment outlines how China would benefit from the creation of a
specialized court system for environmental issues.
To date, there has been no move to develop such a specialized court
within China, but courts in other countries could serve as precedents.11 The
framework currently employed in New Zealand offers a useful model and it
could be modified to conform to a structure similar to China’s other
specialized courts, such as the maritime courts. Such a court would have the
expertise to appropriately handle environmental cases and would insulate
judges from local pressure. This Comment argues that a specialized court
should be adopted to strengthen the country’s potentially powerful
environmental regulatory framework.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of China’s major
environmental issues. Part III then discusses China’s legal system, including
an assessment of its existing environmental legislation, a general overview
of the country’s governmental structure with particular focus on the failure
of the current judicial system, and a caveat that a specialized court is not a
panacea for the difficulties facing China. Part IV reviews two types of
specialized courts that provide approximate potential models for a Chinese
Environmental Court: the Environment Court of New Zealand (“NZEC”)
and China’s maritime courts. Part V examines the viable structure, authority,
jurisdiction, and standing requirements of a specialized environmental court
in China. Finally, Part VI analyzes the potential benefits of a specialized
and Policy Framework in Relation to Environmental Protection in China, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 399, 439-46 (2007) (describing the provisions of the State Council Decision). The
Decision states that “The State shall . . . undertake researches on the establishment of a system for civil as
well as administrative proceedings relating to environmental matters.” Id. at 444. The Decision also
stated, as objectives, that the “[p]rocedure for prosecuting environmental crime shall be improved” and that
“[t]he State shall coordinate cross provincial boundary law enforcement and environmental dispute.” Id. at
445. The Council further expressed the desire to “resolve the problem caused by local protectionism.” Id.
See also Wang¸ supra note 5, at 197 (“In recent years, China has recognized the key role that the legal
system must play in addressing ever-worsening environmental problems. For example, the State Council,
China's highest executive body, has specifically called for the ‘perfection of the legal assistance system for
pollution victims, and research and establishment of an environmental civil and administrative public
interest litigation system.’”).
11
New Zealand has a prominent Environment Court, which will be discussed in more detail
throughout this comment. See infra Part IV.A. New South Wales, Australia also has a specialist
environmental and planning court.
See generally Land and Environment Court,
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lec. India has the India National Environmental Tribunal and National
Environmental Appellate Authority. See Manjit Iqbal, Role of Judiciary in Providing Access to Justice and
Enforcement, presented at the Asia Pacific Regional Conference on Environmental Justice and
Enforcement
(Jan.
14-16,
2008),
www.roap.unep.org/program/Documents/Law08_presentations/Day1/Role_Judiciary_Manjit.ppt
(last
visited Aug. 10, 2008). Bangladesh also created an Environment Court. Id. In addition, Thailand,
Pakistan, and the Philippines have tribunals specializing in environmental matters. See Carmel Crimmins
& Darren Schuettler, Manila Creates Green Courts for Environmental Cases, REUTERS, January 14, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSP16667 (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
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environmental court, including the advantages stemming from judicial
expertise and awareness of a legal forum.
II.

CHINA FACES SEVERE ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
CHALLENGES

China has numerous environmental problems that are interrelated and
increasingly dangerous to both human health and ecosystems. There are
many explanations for these environmental problems, including China’s
complicated history, the country’s rapid economic development, and the
corrupting influence of local interests.
A.

China Has a Variety of Environmental Problems that Combine to
Raise Major Political, Social, Economic, and Health Concerns

China must address its environmental problems for economic, social,
political, and environmental reasons. China’s primary environmental issues
are water pollution, lack of water, air pollution, deforestation, and
desertification.12
China must address these environmental problems
because, among other things, the costs to the economy are crippling.13 The
Communist Party of China (“CPC”) is also concerned that environmental
damage will prompt social unrest.14 The Chinese government itself
recognizes the costs of environmental pollution, as indicated by its 2005
12
For an additional overview of these and other environmental problems, see Eric W. Orts,
Environmental Law with Chinese Characteristics, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 545, 549 (2003).
13
See Elizabeth C. Economy, Environmental Enforcement in China, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 102, 102 (Kristen Day ed., 2005) [hereinafter Economy,
Environmental Enforcement]. “[T]he price tag for China’s environmental degradation and pollution is
estimated to be the equivalent of 8% to 12% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP).” Id.
14
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 87. In another article, Economy discussed a
large protest in June 2007 against the construction of a petrochemical plant in Xiamen. Elizabeth C.
Economy, The Great Leap Backward?: The Costs of China’s Environmental Crisis, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Sept. 1, 2007 [hereinafter Economy, The Great Leap]. She stated that the “Chinese leadership's greatest
fear . . . [is] that its failure to protect the environment may someday serve as the catalyst for broad-based
demands for political change.” Id. “In 2005, China was shaken by 51,000 pollution-triggered ‘public
disturbances’—demonstrations or riots of a hundred or more people protesting the contamination of rivers
and farms—according to the government’s own statistics. (The real figures are almost certainly higher.).”
Christina Larson, China’s Pollution Revolution: Contaminated Rivers and Farms Trigger Peasant Protests,
WASHINGTON MONTHLY, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0712.larson2.html (last
visited Aug. 10, 2008). One such “public disturbance” resulted when a phosphate fertilizer factory caused
widespread damage to crops and endangerment of human health. Sun Xiangming, Is This ‘An Incident of
Counterrevolutionary Destruction?’, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 277, 277 (Lester Ross & Mitchell A. Silk eds., 1987). The local brigade continually implored the
factory and the county to correct the problems, but to no avail. Id. Finally, “[i]n response to the masses’
strong and unanimous demand, and having no other recourse,” a local brigade pulled the “factory’s
electricity switch in an expression of protest.” Id.
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declaration that “[e]nvironmental pollution and ecosystem destruction have
caused enormous economic losses, harmed the health of the masses, and
affected societal stability and environmental safety.”15 To provide a stable
government16 and healthy society, China will have to rectify current, and
prevent future, environmental and natural resource damage.
Water pollution and water shortages are “China’s No. 1 environmental
problem.”17 One report indicates that the groundwater aquifers in ninety
percent of Chinese cities are polluted, and more than seventy-five percent of
surface water in urban areas is unsuitable for drinking and fishing.18 This
leaves hundreds of millions of people without access to safe drinking
water.19 Worse still, the Chinese government has categorized almost thirty
percent of the country’s river water as unsuitable to use even for agriculture
or industry.20 These high levels of water pollution result primarily from the
use of dirty industrial processes without modern environmental controls21
combined with rampant industrial irresponsibility.22 In fact, “[w]ater
pollution is so widespread that regulators say a major incident occurs every
other day.”23 In addition, more than forty percent of China’s cities do not
have a sewage treatment plant.24 The lack of sewers and general scarcity of
clean water cause “nearly 700 million people [to] drink water contaminated
with animal and human waste.”25 Major instances of water pollution only
exacerbate the country’s increasing water shortages. The country is so large
that the availability of water varies depending on the region: the country’s
15

See State Council Decision, supra note 5, at 201.
“The Ministry of Public Security has ranked pollution among the top five threats to China’s peace
and stability.” Larson, supra note 14.
17
Orts, supra note 12, at 551 (quoting Sheri Liao, who is the head of Global Village). Global
Village is an independent environmental group in China. Id.
18
Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14 (discussing a report by the government-run Xinhua
News Agency).
19
Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part I, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches
Deadly Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007 [hereinafter Kahn & Yardley, Part I] (“Nearly 500 million
people lack access to safe drinking water.”).
20
Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14.
21
See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 70 (“Factories and municipalities dump
their untreated waste directly into streams, rivers, and coastal waters”).
22
See generally BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA: LAWMAKING,
COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT; THEORY AND CASES 191-209 (2006). Rooij discusses the necessity of
“secret illegal nightly discharges” for the survival of many small companies, whose size makes compliance
economically infeasible. Id. at 196.
23
Yardley, Part II, supra note 2.
24
See Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 413 (297 out of 661 cities do not have any sewage
treatment plant). One report estimates that “roughly 200 million people live in towns that possess no
sanitation system other than ‘pipes that lead wastewater to the nearest ditch.’” ECONOMY, THE RIVER
RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 71 (quoting the China Human Development Report).
25
Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14.
16
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northern region faces profound water shortages,26 while in the south there is
often destructive flooding.27
Air pollution is another area of primary concern. The Beijing
Olympics pushed air quality to the forefront of government officials’
attention. In an effort to protect athletes’ health, Beijing officials planned
“to limit vehicle use, close factories and do everything in their power to
bring blue skies to Beijing.”28 These are obviously only solutions for the
very short-term. Air pollution is not just a problem in Beijing; throughout
the country citizens breathe unhealthy air.29 Particulate matter is one major
air pollutant that makes China’s air quality unhealthy.30 Particulate matter is
a result of diesel exhaust, coal-fired power plants, and other sources.31 It is
suspected to be the cause of “up to 90 percent of all deaths from outdoor air
pollution.”32 Other problematic air pollutants include nitrogen oxide and
sulfur dioxide.33 The emission of sulfur dioxide, principally caused by coal
burning, leads to acid rains,34 and “China is now the largest source of SO2
emissions in the world.”35 Sulfur dioxide (SO2) is a serious problem both
nationally and internationally. One-third of China is affected by acid rain36
and neighboring countries have blamed China for acid rain occurrence
within their borders.37
26

See Orts, supra note 12, at 552; Zachary Tyler, Note, Transboundary Water Pollution in China:
An Analysis of the Failure of the Legal Framework to Protect Downstream Jurisdictions, 19 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 572, 576 (2006). China is attempting to remedy this disparity and some of the attendant harms
through major water diversion programs, such as the Three Gorges Dam. See Orts, supra note 12, at 552.
These water diversion projects have their own attendant environmental harms. See id.
27
See, e.g., Associated Press, China Floods Kill 57, 1M Flee, TIME, June, 15, 2008.
28
Juliet Macur, Olympic Teams Vying to Defeat Beijing’s Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/24/sports/othersports/24mask.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=china+pollution&st
=nyt&oref=login.
29
See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19. “Only 1% of the country’s 560 million city dwellers
breathe air considered safe by the European Union.” Id.
30
See Orts, supra note 12, at 555. “Airborne particulates in many cities are at two to five times the
maximum concentrations recommended by the World Health Organization.” Id.
31
Keith Bradsher, Choking on Growth: Part VII, Trucks Power China’s Economy, at a Suffocating
Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19.
35
The World Bank & The State Environmental Protection Administration, Cost of Pollution in
China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages, at xi (Feb. 2007), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollutio
n.pdf.
36
Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 407.
37
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 72 (“Japan and South Korea also blame
China for much of their problems with acid rain, a situation that has contributed to ongoing tensions in the
region.”).
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Deforestation and desertification are interrelated environmental
problems. Deforestation has caused such catastrophic flooding that most
logging activities have been banned throughout the country.38 Widespread
desertification in western and northern China is transforming arable land
into desert.39 Although China has been fighting desertification through
massive reforestation campaigns, these re-planting efforts are often
unsuccessful.40 In fact, despite aggressive reforestation efforts, reports show
that a quarter of the entire country has turned to desert.41 Desertification is a
result of poor anti-erosion practices as “[c]enturies of deforestation, along
with the overgrazing of grasslands and overcultivation of cropland, have left
much of China's north and northwest seriously degraded.”42 Desertification
is also problematic because it results in major dust storms.43
B.

There Is No Single Cause of China’s Environmental Problems

Ample reasons exist to explain China’s environmental deterioration.
Some primary causes include China’s traditional approach to the
environment and the devastating effects of rule under Chairman Mao
Zedong. One of the more obvious reasons is the country’s primary focus on
economic development. Another factor is the existence of political and
business influence and corruption at the local level.
1.

China’s Traditions and Political History Contributed to the Country’s
Current Environmental Crisis

Many traditional Chinese approaches to the environment have
prevented successful environmental protection.44
China’s attitudes,
institutions, and policies were, and to some extent still are, “rooted in and
supported by traditional concepts and philosophies such as Confucianism.”45
Confucianism promotes “man’s need to overcome nature in order to utilize it
38

See id. at 67; Orts, supra note 12, at 554.
See Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14. “The Gobi Desert, which now engulfs much of
western and northern China, is spreading by about 1,900 square miles annually.” Id. The direct annual
costs of desertification are estimated at $6.5 billion (USD). Orts, supra note 12, at 553.
40
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 123-24.
41
Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14.
42
Id.
43
See Orts, supra note 12, at 553.
44
See generally Robert P. Weller & Peter Bol, From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature: Chinese
Concepts of the Environment and Their Influence on Policy Implementation, in ENERGIZING CHINA:
RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 473, 473-99 (Michael McElroy et.
al. eds., 1998).
45
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 55.
39
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for his own benefit.”46 While Confucian scholars held a variety of beliefs
about the relationship between man and nature, man was the focus of most
ideas.47 In addition to Confucianism, other schools of thought influenced
China’s treatment of nature and the environment, including Buddhism,
Taoism, and legalism.48
As China transitioned to socialist rule, the environment continued to
suffer. The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) was established in 1949,49
and was led by Mao Zedong until his death in 1976.50 Chairman Mao’s
leadership had devastating consequences for China’s environment and
natural resources. “[M]ajor environmental problems and institutional legal
weakness are legacies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution.”51
2.

China’s Primary Focus on Economic Development Comes at the
Expense of Environmental Degradation

Although China’s history has had significant impacts on its
environment, the country’s environmental problems persist because China
continues to aggressively pursue economic growth.52 Since 1978, when the
government first created a socialist market economy, China’s economy has
continued to expand.53 In fact, until 1996, China's economy grew at an
annual rate of almost ten percent.54 Even today, the pace of economic
growth has lessened only slightly.55 Economic reform brought revolutionary
changes to China,56 including raising hundreds of millions of Chinese people
46
47
48

Id.
See id. at 31-33 for an explanation of the beliefs held by a variety of Confucian scholars.
For a more complete survey of the effects of these philosophies on China’s environment, see id. at

31-36.
49
Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW
1, 9 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997).
50
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 59.
51
Orts, supra note 12, at 557.
52
Mao initiated two “revolutions” intended to “catapult China into Communism and surpass the
industrial achievements of Great Britain and the United States.” See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK,
supra note 7, at 51. Both the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
severely damaged the natural environment. Id. at 51-55. In order to increase grain production, the country
began filling lakes and harvesting forests to open land for farming. Id. at 51-52, 54. With a shift towards
the industrial age and the production of iron and steel, factories were built without consideration for
environmental protection measures. Yuhong Zhao, Environmental Dispute Resolution in China, 16 J.
ENVTL. L. 157, 157 (2004); see also ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 52.
53
Orts, supra note 12, at 549.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 62. The Chinese government may well
be depending on continued economic growth to maintain power. See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note
19 (“the country’s authoritarian system is addicted to fast growth”). China’s economic success has
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out of poverty57 and bringing the country to the top of the world economy.58
However, this economic growth creates numerous environmental problems
because the growth derives primarily from the expansion of heavy industry
and urbanization, both of which increase the use of coal.59 Many now
question whether this fast-paced, environmentally unsustainable economic
growth can continue.60
3.

Local Interests and Corruption Prevent the Enforcement of
Environmental Laws

Local political and business interests are often opposed to increased
environmental protection, particularly because of the economic implications
of requiring expensive equipment and procedures.61
This “local
protectionism” is one reason that existing environmental laws are not
enforced.62 The provincial and local governments that are authorized to
implement and enforce national policies do not necessarily follow the central
placated the public and provided benefits to government officials; but while prosperity continues to
forestall demands for political change, a “major slowdown could incite social unrest, alienate business
interests and threaten the party’s rule.” Id. One reason for the government’s greater focus on
environmental matters is the CPC’s fear of social unrest stemming from major environmental pollution.
See Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14; ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 87.
57
See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19; see also ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra
note 7, at 62.
58
See T.N. Srinivasan, China, India and the World Economy 2 (Stan. Ctr, for Int’l Dev., Working
Paper No. 286, 2006), available at http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/SCID286.pdf (“In terms of absolute level of
Gross National Income (GNI) at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates in 2004, China . . . was
second largest in the World, second only to the United States”); Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19
(“rapid industrialization and urbanization have . . . made the country the world’s largest producer of
consumer goods”).
59
Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19 (“there is little question that growth came at the expense of
the country’s air, land and water”). “The economy is on a historic run, posting a succession of double-digit
growth rates. But the growth derives . . . from a staggering expansion of heavy industry and urbanization
that requires colossal inputs of energy, almost all from coal, the most readily available, and dirtiest,
source.” Id.
60
If China wishes to successfully transition to a global market economy, China will have to create a
more sustainable economy and will have to discover ways to preserve the environmental resources on
which social development depends. Orts, supra note 12, at 549. “[T]he rapidity of economic growth in
China raises questions about its environmental sustainability. China has paid for fast economic growth
with widespread environmental damage. To continue its successful transition to a global market economy,
China must find ways to square the incentives of economic development with the preservation of the
environmental resources on which social development depends.” Id.
61
See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, The Limits of the Law in Addressing China’s
Environmental Dilemma, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 405, 411 (Michael B. McElroy, et. al eds., 1998). The authors state that
environmental laws “fail to anticipate the possibility that certain government interests, particularly those of
departments with major economic responsibilities, might diverge sharply from those of local environmental
protection officers. In such situations, local officials might be reluctant to impose serious sanctions even
for major violations of environmental laws.” Id.
62
Economy, Environmental Enforcement, supra note 13, at 104.
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government’s dictates, especially national environmental policies.63 These
lower governments often have a stake in polluting industries,64 allowing
local and provincial officials to benefit from lax enforcement.65 “China’s
weak legal tradition . . . enables corruption to flourish.”66 Within the judicial
system, the self-serving local influence continues; local judiciaries often are
dependant on provincial and local governments for funding,67 and
“[u]nsurprisingly, conflicts of interest frequently are resolved in favor of
local officials’ priority on economic development.”68 Corruption typically
results from “family, friendships, and other contacts and reciprocities,” and
undermines all hope for evenhanded law enforcement.69
III.

CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM IS NOT PREPARED TO PROTECT CHINA’S
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES

There are legal obstacles to protecting the environment in China.
Both the existing legal system generally and its specific environmental
63
See Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14 (“local officials rarely heed Beijing’s environmental
mandates”); Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 423-24; Economy, Environmental Enforcement, supra note
13, at 104 (no “follow-through on central mandates to local levels”).
64
See Adam Briggs, China’s Pollution Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable Remedy, 18 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 316-17 (2006) (“any municipality’s worst polluter will often also be its largest
employer and largest source of revenue”). See also Economy, Environmental Enforcement, supra note 13,
at 108.
65
See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 118. Interviews with local enforcement
officials revealed that industries were difficult to fine or close down “because they are central to the health
of the local economy.” Id. A representative example of the pressure of local influence can be seen in the
case of Zhang Changjian et al. v. Rongping Chemical Plant, where a group of villagers filed a lawsuit
against Asia’s largest producer of potassium chlorate. See Wang, supra note 5, at 212-19 (providing a
review and analysis of the case). The plant was releasing pollutants that were negatively impacting
villagers’ health and destroying timber stands, bamboo, fruit trees, and crops. Id. at 213. The plaintiffs
were subject to great pressures as a result of the lawsuit; for instance, the lead plaintiff was assaulted while
collecting water samples, and other plaintiffs were attacked physically and financially. Id. at 215.
66
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 92.
67
Ruth Greenspan Bell, Culture and History Count: Choosing Environmental Tools to Fit Available
Institutions and Experience, 38 IND. L. REV. 637, 645 (2005); Alford & Shen, supra note 61, at 416
(“Subnational judicial salaries and court operating expenses come from subnational, rather than national,
funds, leading some observers to question their capacity to maintain a high degree of independence from
local officialdom.”). Judges’ career advancement is also “frequently determined locally rather than
nationally.” Id. “The local government controls both the personnel and the budget of the courts, making
political intervention in the legal system a common problem.” Economy, Environmental Enforcement,
supra note 13, at 109.
68
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 92.
69
Professor Jerome Cohen, Keynote Address at the Vermont Law School Symposium: An
Introduction to Law in China (Mar. 2, 2007), in 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. at 402. As one example, in a lawsuit
against a copper factory, the factory “was set up by the local government itself, had the head of the local
trade commission as its chief executive, and would certainly be indemnified by the local government if the
plaintiffs’ case was a success . . . .
Any local judge weighing evidence and deliberating the
outcome . . . would realize that his own salary was tied to his decision. This realization would make bias or
the appearance of bias unavoidable.” Briggs, supra note 64, at 330.
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regulatory framework prevent adequate protection of the country’s
ecosystems. The government has an essentially non-existent enforcement
mechanism, a weak judicial branch, and vague environmental laws. Each of
these factors contributes to China’s inability to protect its environmental
resources and human health.
A.

China Has Numerous Environmental Laws, but They Have Not
Effectively Addressed the Country’s Environmental Challenges

Historically, environmental protection was considered the purview of
the Emperor and his officials; and so individual citizens had little
responsibility and took little action to protect the environment.70 Under that
regime, the extent of protection afforded land and water resources depended
on how responsibly individual officials executed their duty to protect the
natural world.71
In 1978, China, recognizing the need for environmental protection,
amended the Chinese Constitution by inserting provisions that require the
state to protect the environment and natural resources as well as prevent
pollution and other public hazards.72 Presently, the Chinese Constitution
prohibits damage to natural resources73 and places a duty on the State to
protect the environment.74 However, these constitutional rights are not
directly enforceable by the judiciary unless statutes clearly direct the courts
to apply a particular right.75
Environmental laws abound in China. The National People’s
Congress (“NPC”) has enacted roughly twenty statutes “primarily
addressing pollution control, natural resource conservation, and product
stewardship.”76
In addition to these statutes, China has extensive
70

See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 56.
Id.
72
Id. at 95-96.
73
XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 9, § 2 (1982) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C)
[hereinafter XIAN FA].
74
XIAN FA art. 26. The Constitution also provides citizens the “right to criticize” and the “right to
make complaints . . . for violations of law,” both of which should be used to raise awareness of
environmental and natural resource damage. XIAN FA, art. 41, § 1; see also Xioping Chen, The Difficult
Road for Rights Advocacy An Unpredictable Future for the Development of Law in China, 16 TRANSNAT’L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2006).
75
Ji Li, When Are There More Laws? When Do They Matter? Using Game Theory to Compare
Laws, Power Distribution, and Legal Environments in the United States and China, 16 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 335, 340 (2007). But see M. Ulric Killion, Post-WTO China and Independent Judicial Review, 26
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 507, 553-56 (2004) (discussing action by the Supreme People’s Court that arguably
establishes the Court’s ability to interpret and directly apply the Constitution); Chris Lin, A Quiet
Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 255, 270-74 (2003).
76
Ferris & Zhang, supra note 5, at 583-84. These laws include: The Air Pollution Prevention and
Control Law, The Clean Production Promotion Law, The Law on Desertification Prevention, The
71
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administrative regulations.77 While China has successfully passed a plethora
of environmental laws, policies, and regulations, these have not been
implemented.78 According to one of China's top environmental lawyers,
“barely ten percent of China's environmental laws and regulations are
actually enforced.”79 The failure of China’s extensive environmental regime
is likely a result of weak legal institutions.80
Another factor contributing to the failure of a seemingly
comprehensive scheme is the vague language of the laws.81 The laws are
drafted in such a manner that, even if local governments were to attempt
enforcement, the laws can be interpreted with extreme lenity. Some have
speculated that these laws are intentionally vague, designed to symbolize
China’s desire to correct the country’s environmental problems, while
maintaining the status quo in economic development.82 Thus, the laws
function more like policy statements.83
China’s environmental laws provide the tools for non-governmental
enforcement through a private right of action. The Environmental Protection
Law,84 China’s general environmental statute, places liability on polluters.85
Environmental Impact Assessment Law, The Energy Conservation Law, The Environmental Noise
Pollution Law, The Fisheries Law, The Flood Prevention Law, The Forestry Law, The Grasslands Law,
The Land Administration Law, The Law on the Prevention of Environmental Pollution Caused by Solid
Waste, The Marine Environmental Protection Law, The Mineral Resource Law, The Water and Soil
Conservation Law, The Water Law, The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, and The Wildlife
Protection Law. Id.
77
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 101. By 2001, China had passed more than
123 administrative regulations. Economy also explains that these laws are complemented by more than 20
technical environmental regulations issued by the State Council, 100 environmental rules and methods, and
more than 300 standards formulated by SEPA and other State Council ministries and agencies. Id.
78
Benjamin J. Richardson, Is East Asia Industrializing Too Quickly? Environmental Regulation in
Its Special Economic Zones, 22 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 150, 153-154 (2004). One issue that contributes to
this implementation problem is that “legislative documents often contain ambiguities, irreconcilable
provisions and indefinite standards.” Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 174.
79
Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14.
80
Richardson, supra note 78, at 153-54.
81
Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 174.
82
See Briggs, supra note 64, at 312-13. For a non-environmental example, see XiXin Wang, Suing
the Sovereign Observed from the Chinese Perspective: The Idea and Practice of State Compensation in
China, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 681, 689 (2003) (“ . . . the current state compensation system also
reveals the hesitation and anxiety of the government, as evident in the substantial limits of individuals' right
to state compensation . . . . If we agree that the state compensation system must go beyond mere
symbolism, those problems that are plaguing this system both in theory and in practice must be treated
seriously”).
83
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 101. William Alford, a China legal expert,
remarked that “China’s environmental laws are like policy statements rather than laws in the Western
sense.” Id.
84
The Environmental Protection Law is the “cardinal law for environmental protection in China.”
Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and Pollution
Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 294 (2007) (quoting a
1996 State Council Report). The Environmental Protection Law establishes the national and local
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A polluter will be liable for damages caused by its actions despite
compliance with state standards; this is known as no-fault liability.86 In
addition, the burden of proof is placed on defendants in court proceedings;
the polluter is forced to prove that its actions did not cause the damages at
issue.87 Each of these requirements should promote successful citizen suits.
are more likely to be successful when a polluter is liable despite apparent
compliance with state standards, because the polluter is forced forcing a
polluter to prove that it did not cause the damage at issue.
Unfortunately, many observe that China’s court system remains
weak.88 In addition, the nation has not traditionally had a culture of utilizing
lawyers, courts, or the law in general to resolve disputes;89 therefore, few
will resort to court action on environmental matters.90 As a result, the
existing court system is woefully inadequate to remedy the spiraling
deterioration of China’s ecological systems.
B.

The Overall Design of the Chinese Legal System Prevents Adequate
Enforcement of Environmental Laws

China is essentially a one-party government,91 controlled by the
CPC.92 The PRC, as a socialist state, centers its government in people’s
congresses, which are responsible for creating and supervising all
environmental protection bureaus, contains specific provisions for the management and supervision of the
environment, pollution control, and legal liability associated with pollution, and requires that provincial
governments evaluate the environmental impact of their activities. Id.
85
Environmental Protection Law art. 41 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Dec. 26,
1989, effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) (“A unit that
has caused environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to eliminate it & make compensation
to the unit or individual that has suffered direct losses.”).
86
Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 178-79.
87
Wang, supra note 5, at 209 (citing Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in
Civil Procedures, a document released by the Supreme People’s Courts). One statutory example of the
burden of proof states, “[f]or a damage suit arising from the environmental pollution by solid wastes, the
inflictor shall assume the burden of proof for the statutory exemption and the nonexistence of causation
between its acts and harmful consequences.” Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental
Pollution by Solid Wastes art. 86 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Dec. 29, 2004,
effective Apr. 1, 2005), LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.).
88
Wang, supra note 5, at 202.
89
Id.
90
For instance, “[o]nly 9% of people will negotiate with the polluter directly, and only 2% [of]
people will sue to the court . . . .” Professor Li Zhiping, Address at the Vermont Law School Symposium:
Environmental Challenges Facing Rural Areas in the Process of Industrialization (March 2, 2007), in 8 VT.
J. ENVTL. L. at 426. Professor Li Zhiping’s speech provides more information on the survey, particularly
the specifics of how the survey was completed. Id. at 426-27. The survey was conducted by about thirteen
students in his environmental law clinic and environmental law classes, over a period of four months,
through interviews and questionnaires. Id.
91
See XIAN FA Preamble (“Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China . . . ”).
92
See JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT & TRANSFORMATION 106-07 (2008).
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administrative, judicial, prosecutorial, and military agencies of the state.93
The NPC is the highest “organ” of state power,94 exercising legislative
authority at the central level.95 The Constitution also empowers a smaller
body,96 the Standing Committee of the NPC, with essentially the same
authority as the NPC.97
The directives of the NPC and the Standing Committee are executed
by the State Council and its agencies.98 The State Council is comprised of
various departments, commissions, administrations, and offices.99 The same
legislative and administrative bodies exist at each level of government. The
top-down structure provides for little oversight and thus prevents proper
enforcement of environmental laws because prevalent regional protectionism
creates a tendency for local governments to disregard central government
rules and regulations.100
The judicial branch consists of both courts and procuratorates.101 The
courts’ structure, divided into four levels, mirrors the top-down hierarchy of
the State Council.102 China’s judiciary is quite decentralized, with control of
the lower courts’ personnel and budget resting in local governments.103
93
See Wang Chenguang, supra note 49, at 15. There are essentially five levels of government:
1) central, 2) provincial, 3) prefectural (which includes large cities and autonomous regions), 4) county and
city, and 5) township/village. Id. at 16.
94
XIAN FA art. 57. See JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at 113. The NPC convenes once a year, and is
composed of almost 3000 deputies. CHINA: OUTLINES OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 43, 45 (Zhang Fusen & Hu Zejun, eds., 2004).
95
A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PRC 3 (Chris Hunter et al., eds., 1997).
96
The Standing Committee is composed of less than 200 members. JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at
117.
97
The Standing Committee is, among other things, empowered to interpret the Constitution and
supervise its implementation; to make, revise, and interpret most statutes; and to supervise the State
Council and other government bodies. See XIAN FA art. 67.
98
JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at 119. The State Council is elected by the NPC. A GUIDE TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PRC, supra note 95, at 4. Although the Constitution theoretically vests all state
power in the NPC and its Standing Committee, the State Council seems to be much more powerful than one
would suspect. JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at 119.
99
See A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PRC, supra note 95, at 5.
100
Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 424.
101
The Chinese procuratorate is not only responsible for prosecutions but is also responsible for “the
supervision of law” and supervision of important State departments. Ye Feng, The Chinese Procuratorate
and the Anti-Corruption Campaigns in the People’s Republic of China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li, & Jan Michiel Otto, eds., 2002). The people’s
procuratorates are the “state organs for legal supervision.” XIAN FA art. 129. The procuratorate system has
an organizational structure similar to the court system.
See A Brief Introduction to China,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.asp.
102
ZOU KEYUAN, CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 144 (2006). The levels are:
1) The Supreme People’s Court, 2) the Higher People’s Courts, 3) the Intermediate People’s Courts, and
4) the Basic People’s Courts. Id. To give an idea, there are more than 2200 county courts across the
country; there are intermediate courts in every major city; and at the provincial level there are 32 high
courts. XiXin Wang, supra note 82, at 682.
103
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 112.
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Traditionally, judges were often military officers or merely demobilized
soldiers or other civil servants; these individuals often had only a high
school education and had no legal training or practice.104 While there is an
ongoing effort to move away from this system, judges still often lack legal
education and training.105 This lack of legal competence is problematic
because China’s environmental laws and environmental issues are often
complicated.
For China’s legal system to effectively control environmental damage,
it is imperative that the judicial system diligently sustain environmental laws
and rights. “No matter how perfect the environmental law is and how
propitious the provisions are to defend the environmental rights and
interests, the environmental law is meaningless if lawyers and judges have
no knowledge of the particularity of environmental law.”106
One
organization stated that “[w]hile environmental law is a burgeoning field of
study, few judges, lawyers or environmental officials have received formal
training. Consequently, environmental cases are difficult to handle. Lack of
knowledge of the law affects pollution victims’ ability to get fair, timely
redress.”107 Potential problems that arise as a result of a judiciary without
expertise in environmental law include succumbing to local influence,
failing to recognize an environmental pollution case, or misplacing the
burden of proving causation.
One water pollution case highlights the corrupting effect that local
pressures can have on the legal system. The plaintiffs’ mango crops were
diseased as a result of dust and smog pollution from two nearby cement
plants.108 After the plaintiffs prevailed in the first trial, the defendants
inspired government and CPC party officials to get involved.109 The
resulting report by the government and party officials suggested that the first

104

Id. at 113.
Alford & Shen, supra note 61, at 417.
106
Hu Jing, Case of Water Pollution Damage in Dexing City of Jiangxi Province, at 10, CLAPV Case
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA. CLAPV stands for the Center for Legal
Assistance to Pollution Victims.
107
Xu Kezhu, Training Strengthens Environmental Law in China, CLAPV Media Reports, Jan. 5,
2008, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=MR. In order to combat this lack of understanding
and formal training, CLAPV provides annual training sessions in environmental law to increase judges’,
practitioners’, and officials’ practical and theoretical understanding of environmental law. See id. Lecture
topics included current environmental legislation, handling complicated issues in environmental tort
litigation, rules of evidence in civil cases, handling environmental disputes, application of environmental
standards in litigation, and implementation of environmental law in China. Id.
108
Xu Kezhu, Case of Air Pollution Damage by Cement Plants in Yulin City of Guangxi Province, at
1-3, CLAPV Case Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA.
109
Id. at 7.
105
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judge had incorrectly decided the case for a variety of reasons.110 A retrial
was granted, and a panel determined that the plaintiffs’ evidence was too
general and that there was no direct evidence of pollution damages.111 Local
economic influences were able to manipulate the court’s lack of awareness
and comprehension of environmental laws. Confusion among the courts and
judges will not result in constructive case decisions.
In another lawsuit, tendencies to protect local factories could not
influence the court, because the impacted, polluting enterprises were in a
different county from the court.112 Upstream factories dumped numerous
pollutants into a river, resulting in downstream duck and fish farmers losing
significant portions of their stocks.113 The plaintiffs brought suit after
government negotiations failed.114 The plaintiff farmers initiated suit in their
home county, where the injuries occurred.115 The defendants attempted to
have the case moved to the court in the defendant’s county, but the court
refused.116 While the plaintiffs in this case benefited from being before the
local court,117 there are many other instances where the desire to protect
local industries works against the plaintiff, especially when the polluting
defendant resides in the same county as the court.118
A recent case highlights the failure of one court to recognize novel
environmental pollution cases. In LiFaJun v. Suzuki Car Company Ltd., a
widower, Mr. Zhu, uncovered evidence that his wife may have died as a

110

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8-9.
112
See Wang Canfa, Water Pollution Damages Case in Pizhou, Jiangsu Province, at 1, CLAPV Case
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA (describing how pollution from the upper
reaches of the Fang Ting River, which begins in Tongshan County, reached the lower reaches of the river,
including portions in Pizhou City). Pizhou City is a different county-level city than Tongshan County,
although both are under the jurisdiction of Xuzhou in Jiangsu Province. See Cities and Towns,
http://www.jiangsu.net/city/.
113
Wang Canfa, supra note 112, at 4-5.
114
See id. at 1-4, 4.
115
See id. at 5.
116
Id. at 5.
117
Another factor weighing in the plaintiffs’ favor in this instance was the provision of free legal
resources that the plaintiffs received.
118
One prominent environmental lawyer explained that “[i]n all of the suits that we have lost, the
courts have not followed the law. Instead they ignored the legal or technical merits of our case in order to
support the local enterprises.” Ted Plafker, Nascent “Green Culture” is Challenging Authorities—and
Being Heard: Chinese Activists Take to the Courts, INT’L HERALD TRIB., August 28, 2002, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/08/28/rbeijing_ed3_.php?pass=true. It is difficult to obtain information
on Chinese cases because many of them are not published and when they are they are not available in
English translations. When organizations, such as CLAPV, produce information about environmental
cases, it is usually to laud the rare victory.
111
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result of benzene poisoning.119 Shortly after purchasing a new car, Mrs. Zhu
passed away; subsequently the benzene level in the car’s interior was tested
and found to exceed the indoor air quality standard.120 Mr. Zhu sued Suzuki,
the car manufacturer, because he believed that a flaw in their product
resulted in Mrs. Zhu’s death.121 The court rejected the lawsuit on the
grounds that Mr. Zhu had not provided adequate evidence of causation that
the benzene levels resulted in Mrs. Zhu’s death.122 If the lawsuit had been
brought under the Environmental Protection Law, Mr. Zhu would not have
had the burden of proving causation; the burden would have been placed on
the car manufacturer to show that the high levels of benzene in the car did
not cause Mrs. Zhu’s death.123 The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution
Victims in China (“CLAPV”) agreed to assist Mr. Zhu in his appeal after
professors affiliated with CLAPV “determined that this was a unique type of
environmental pollution case and that the first court had erred in its exercise
of the law.”124 On appeal, Mr. Zhu’s attorneys framed the case as an
environmental pollution case, but the higher court still rejected the claim.125
If the courts had recognized that benzene was an air pollutant and that cases
regarding potential injuries resulting from that pollutant should be tried
under the EPL,126 the outcome for Mr. Zhu would likely have been very
different. Lawsuits based on environmental torts are a relatively recent
phenomenon; courts must be able and willing to recognize and
accommodate cases involving environmental pollution.
As discussed above, Chinese environmental laws shift the burden of
proof to the defendant.127 In general, a plaintiff in a tort case would be
required to prove that a defendant’s actions had caused the alleged harm. In
119
CLAPV, LiFaJun v. Suzuki Car Company Ltd., CLAPV Legal Aid Cases, July 11, 2008,
http://www.clapv.org/new/show_en.php?id=89&catename=LAC [hereinafter LiFaJun v. Suzuki Car
Company].
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
In the United States, indoor air pollution is regulated and monitored by the Environmental
Protection Agency. See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Indoor Air Quality Homepage,
http://www.epa.gov/iaq/index.html.
127
Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures art. 4, states:
“The burden of proof in the tort actions shall be assumed according to the following rules . . . . In a
compensation lawsuit for damages caused by environmental pollution, the infringing party shall be
responsible for producing evidence to prove the existence of exemptions of liabilities as provided in laws or
that there is no causal relationship between his act and the harmful consequences . . . .” Some Provisions of
the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures art. 4 (promulgated by the Supreme People’s
Court, Dec. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.).
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environmental tort cases, once the plaintiff shows injury and some contact
with the defendant, the defendant has to prove that the plaintiff’s injuries
were caused by something else besides the defendant’s actions. This
inversion of the burden of proof is extremely beneficial when employed.
Often, however, a court does not understand that the burden of proof must be
shifted or does not recognize that a case is an environmental tort deserving
of the inversion. In the cement plant case described above, the court
attempted on retrial to place the burden of proof onto the plaintiff, instead of
on the defendant where it belonged because the case was for damages from
environmental pollution.128 The failure of courts to recognize that the
burden of proof must be transferred to the defendant is especially
problematic when the plaintiff does not know that the burden should be
shifted either, so the plaintiff does not even present it as a possibility to the
court. In one case, the plaintiff failed to raise the burden of proof allocation
because the plaintiff lacked knowledge of environmental court cases.129 The
plaintiff, the Shuangxi Reservoir Management Bureau, stocked the reservoir
with fish that were subsequently killed in large numbers by the release of
machine oil from the generator room of the upstream Power Station.130 As
one lawyer on the case stated, “[t]he undertaking judge is obviously ignorant
of environmental law, due to which Inversion of Burden of Proof is not
adopted in the court hearing. It is urgent for judges and lawyers to take up
universal knowledge of environmental law, independent branch of laws, with
environmental torts taking place at an increasing rate.”131 Cases involving
complex environmental laws and science would be more appropriately
handled in a court experienced in such cases.
C.

A Specialized Court Would Not Provide All of the Answers To China’s
Environmental Problems, But These Challenges Can Be Indirectly
Addressed Through An Environmental Court

While the solution to China’s failing environmental paradigm offered
in this comment—developing a specialized court to hear environmental
issues—would benefit China’s legal system and help the country face
environmental challenges, the effectiveness of such a specialized court
128
Xu Kezhu, Case of Air Pollution Damage by Cement Plants in Yulin City of Guangxi Province, at
8, CLAPV Case Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA.
129
Hu Jing, Case of Water Pollution Damage in Dexing City of Jianxi Province, at 10, CLAPV Case
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA.
130
Id. at 1-2.
131
Hu Jing, Case of Water Pollution Damage in Dexing City of Jiangxi Province, at 10, CLAPV Case
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA.
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should not be overstated. There are areas of concern that a specialized court
could only indirectly ameliorate. China has grave environmental challenges
that cannot easily be remedied. In addition, other issues may compromise
any gain in environmental protection that results from a specialized court,
including non-enforcement,132 corruption,133 and the technical difficulty of
correcting already existing problems. In order for the specialized court to
effectively function, citizens must be aware of this forum and be willing to
utilize it. It is encouraging to note that Chinese citizens are more frequently
heading to court with the gravest pollution problems,134 but people must be
willing to challenge less obvious, but nonetheless serious, pollution and
natural resource destruction. Ideally, providing a specialized forum will
increase the use of litigation as a means of dispute resolution135 to challenge
a variety of environmentally destructive activities. However, without proper
legal assistance, Chinese citizens may remain without adequate access to the
judicial system. Non-profit legal assistance will be an important contributor
to the effective operation and legitimacy of an environmental court
system.136
The legal road ahead for Chinese environmental activists promises to
be difficult, but these difficulties and the potential for failure only
underscore the importance of reform and should not prevent an attempt at
stability and success. A specialized court would benefit China’s legal system

132
An environmental court could not directly increase the level of enforcement. Increased
enforcement will result most directly from changing attitudes of government officials.
133
Corruption can be addressed to some extent when the State brings charges against government
officials. The central Chinese government does realize the important of environmental enforcement and
has attempted to address the problem of lax enforcement and corruption through laws and regulations. In
order to address dereliction of duty by government officials, the central government has produced the
Provisional Measures on the Penalties for Violation of Law or Discipline in Environmental Protection, the
Explanation on Certain Issues Relating to the Governing Law in the Criminal Trial for Environmental
Pollution Cases by the Higher People’s Court, and the Higher People’s Procuratorate’s Standard for
Indictment of Dereliction of Duty. See Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10 (translating the regulations).
134
See Wang, supra note 5, at 204.
135
The number of environmental disputes increases every year. Wang Canfa, Keynote Address at the
Vermont Law School Symposium: Special Functions of Promoting Public Participation in Environmental
Protection in Aiding Pollution Victims (March 2, 2007), in China in Transition: Environmental Challenges
in the Far East, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. at 384-85. “[E]very year there’s at least 20% to 30% increase in
environmental complaints” submitted to environmental authorities. Id.
136
See Wang, supra note 5, at 204-05. Many argue for NGO standing to sue in environmental
pollution cases. See Patti Goldman, Panel Address at the Vermont Law School Symposium: The
International Silk Road: Engaging Domestic Efforts to Protect China’s Environment (March 2, 2007), in
China in Transition: Environmental Challenges in the Far East, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. at 448-49; see also
Orts, supra note 12, at 562-64. See generally Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in
China: Lessons Learned From the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251 (2007). This would greatly
increase the likelihood that cases would be heard by a specialized environmental tribunal.
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and would begin to resolve many of the problems responsible for
environmental degradation.
IV.

CHINA SHOULD USE THE MODELS OF EXISTING SPECIALIZED COURTS
TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

China should adopt a specialized court system in order to address the
complicated legal issues presented by environmental litigation. Both the
New Zealand Environmental Court (“NZEC”) and China’s maritime courts
could provide models for the development of an environmental court in
China. Environmental and maritime issues are both very complicated areas
of law, which benefit from having knowledgeable judicial officials resolve
issues. The NZEC is a specialized tribunal that addresses environmental and
natural resources issues and disputes in New Zealand. Similarly, the
maritime courts in China have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve maritime and
admiralty disputes.
A.

New Zealand’s Environment Court Offers a Solution for Managing
Environmental Disputes

New Zealand is at the forefront of developing specialized
environmental jurisprudence.137 It has benefited from the use of a special
tribunal to review planning decisions since 1953, when the Town and
Country Planning Appeal Board was created.138 In 1991, the country merged
statutory planning and environmental controls into one comprehensive law:
the Resource Management Act (“RMA”).139 The RMA is New Zealand’s
primary environmental statute,140 and “[t]here are few aspects of the
management of the air, land and water that are not within its purview.”141 In

137
“A specialised adjudicative tribunal . . . is a rarity in the world of environmental law . . . . Apart
from New South Wales, Australia, and the Planning Board Tribunals in the United Kingdom . . . [there are
no] other specialised tribunals with the status of courts of law that are particularly focussed on resolving
environmental disputes.” Bret Birdsong, Adjudicating Sustainability: New Zealand’s Environment Court
and the Resource Management Act 1, Ian Axford (New Zealand) Fellowship in Public Policy (Oct. 1998),
available at http://www.fulbright.org.nz/voices/axford/docs/birdsongb.pdf [hereinafter Birdsong 1998].
138
The Planning Appeal Board and its successors provided the basis for the current Environmental
Court. Trevor Daya-Winterbottom, Evolving Practice—the Environment Court of New Zealand, 13 ENVTL
LIABILITY 119, 119-20 (2005).
139
Resource
Management
Act,
1991,
No.
69
(N.Z.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1991/0069/latest/DLM230265.html [hereinafter RMA].
140
David Grinlinton, Access to Environmental Justice in New Zealand, 1999 ACTA JURIDICA 80, 80
(1999).
141
Id. at 80. There are, however, “a number of areas of environmental law [that] remain outside the
Act.” Id.
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1996, amendments to the RMA created the Environment Court.142 This
institution was an important addition to the RMA. One scholar notes that
“[the Environment Court] can be said to serve as judge, jury, and
executioner over most of the fundamental aspects of the RMA regime.”143
The NZEC is an expert tribunal that primarily addresses public interest
questions related to resource management and environmental law.144
The establishment of the NZEC is generally accepted as a “notable
success.”145 One former Environment Court judge concluded that “the
[NZEC] has established a practice of open and patient hearings, and
reasoned decisions that have normative value for primary decision-makers
and professional advisers.”146 Overall, the NZEC plays an important role in
protecting the country’s public resources and the public interest under the
RMA.147
B.

Chinese Specialized Courts Address Complicated and Important
Subjects in Ways that Can Inform the Creation of a Chinese
Environmental Court

Specialized courts are authorized under the provisions of China’s Law
on the Organization of the People’s Courts of the People's Republic of China
(“Organization Law”).148 Article 2 of the 1979 Organization Law stipulates
that “the trial power of the People’s Republic of China is exercised by the
following people's courts: (1) local people’s courts at various levels; (2)
specialized people’s courts; [and] (3) the Supreme People’s Court . . . .
Specialized people’s courts include: military courts, railway transport
courts, maritime transport courts, forestry courts and other specialized
courts.”149
Currently, China has specialized courts for each of these areas of
law,150 as well as a specialized court for patent, copyright, and trademark

142
RMA, Part 11, §§ 247-308, and Part 12, §§ 309-343D, are the provisions that detail the specifics
of the Environment Court.
143
Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 1.
144
Daya-Winterbottom, supra note 138, at 121.
145
Id. at 120.
146
Id.
147
Stephen Higgs, Mediating Sustainability, 37 ENVTL. L. 61, 80 (2007).
148
See Curtis Pew, Robert Jarvis, & Mark Sidel, Maritime Courts in the Middle Kingdom: China’s
Great Leap Seaward, 11 MAR. LAW. 237, n.7 (1986). The law was adopted in 1951. Id.
149
See id.; see also Organic Law of the People’s Courts (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the
NPC, Sept. 2, 1983, effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct 28, 2008) (P.R.C.).
150
Mark Sidel, The Acceptance of Emerging American Law Abroad: Could ‘Maritime RICO’ Work
in the People’s Republic of China, 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 99, 105 (1987).
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disputes.151 One scholar explains that the purpose of these courts is to
provide a judicial body which is capable of handling specific, complex areas
of the law.152 This same rationale suggests that a specialized environmental
court would benefit both China’s environment and China’s judiciary, by
raising the quality of judicial decision-making.
China’s maritime courts serve as an instructive example of an
effective specialized court whose structure and operation could be
incorporated to develop an environmental court.153 China’s maritime courts
system are a useful model because they have experience resolving complex
disputes and they demonstrate the type of judicial institution that would be
acceptable to the Chinese government.
V.

A SPECIALIZED ENVIRONMENTAL COURT WOULD SUIT CHINA’S
CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM

The Chinese government should exploit its ability to develop
specialized courts under Chinese law and create a court dedicated to
overseeing environmental and natural resource disputes. In developing an
environmental court, China should consider the examples that the NZEC and
the Chinese maritime courts offer.154 The Chinese Environmental Courts’
structure, authority, jurisdiction, and standing requirements should be
developed through modification of New Zealand’s Environment Court and
China’s maritime courts.
A.

The Structure of the NZEC and the Maritime Courts Should Be Used
as a Model for the Creation of a Chinese Environmental Court

The NZEC is not a very large judicial body; it is currently composed
of seven Judges, three Alternate Judges, fifteen Commissioners, and six

151

See Ryan Goldstein et. al., Specialized IP Trial Courts Around the World, 18 No. 10 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L. J. 1 (Oct. 2006). These courts were created in 1993. Id.
152
Mark Hamilton, Sailing in a Sea of Obscurity: The Growing Importance or China’s Maritime
Arbitration Commission, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 477, 505-06 (2002). “[J]udges have developed
technical and legal expertise from repeated exposure to . . . cases and experience interpreting . . . law. This
enables . . . judges to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently.” Id. at 505.
153
Maritime courts were established by the NPC Standing Committee in 1984 with the Decision of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of Maritime Courts in
Coastal Port Cities. Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 241.
154
Of course, “any recommendations coming from an outside Western observer must be careful to
take into account the unique legal, political, and cultural situation of Chinese society. Direct ‘transplants’
of Western environmental laws are unlikely to take root very easily, if at all . . . . Environmental solutions
for China should focus instead on building the basic institutional infrastructure and capacities needed for an
effective and efficient administrative legal system . . . .” Orts, supra note 12, at 546.
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Deputy Commissioners.155 The Environmental Judges are ordinary judges
who are appointed for life, while the Environmental Commissioners are
experts who are appointed for five year terms.156 The commissioners are
technically-oriented laypersons157 who work alongside judges, preside over
hearings, and assist in writing judicial decisions.158 The commissioners are
not required to have legal training159 because they are appointed to ensure
that the NZEC “possesses a mix of knowledge and experience” in relevant
matters.160 Hearings are generally open to the public and are relatively
informal, as the court is not bound by the country’s rules of evidence.161
China’s maritime courts have a different structure than the NZEC.
There are multiple maritime courts, located all along China’s coast.162 The
maritime courts are trial-level courts only,163 with appeals managed by the
relevant provincial Supreme Courts.164 The individual maritime courts are
divided into different offices, with two different trial divisions. One trial
section handles admiralty cases, while the other manages maritime
commerce issues.165 Each court also has a research office and a court
administration office.166 There is a court president who oversees every
office, while each trial division additionally has its own president.167 Many
of the maritime courts’ judges have formal training in maritime law.168
155
Environment Court of New Zealand, http://www.justice.govt.nz/environment/home.asp (last
visited Apr. 17, 2008). “A quorum for the court is one judge and one commissioner, but hearings can also
be held with one judge and two commissioners or, more rarely, a judge or commissioner sitting alone.”
Higgs, supra note 147, at 75.
156
Bret Birdsong, Adjudicating Sustainability: New Zealand’s Environment Court, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1, 32-33 (May 2002) [hereinafter Birdsong 2002].
157
Id. at 4.
158
See id. at 33. The commissioners also oversee court mediation, which is a method of dispute
resolution that is actively promoted by NZEC. Id.
159
Higgs, supra note 147, at 75.
160
RMA § 253. Desirable skills include expertise in business, economics, local government affairs,
planning and resource management, environmental science, architecture and engineering, or techniques in
alternative dispute resolution. Higgs, supra note 147, at 75; see also RMA § 253; Environment Court of
New Zealand, Mediation, http://www.justice.govt.nz/environment/procedure/mediation.asp (last visited
April 18, 2008) (“Experience in alternative dispute resolution is one of the criteria for eligibility for
appointment as an Environment Commissioner.”).
161
Higgs, supra note 147, at 75. There are three courthouses where hearings take place, but, as a
circuit court, it also will travel to hold hearings near the locality of the subject matter in dispute. Id.
162
Peter Murray, China: An Emerging Jurisdiction, in JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW 119-135, 119 (Martin Davies ed., 2005). Originally there were five
maritime courts established, but currently there are ten maritime courts and twenty-seven branch courts. Id.
163
The maritime courts have the same status as intermediate courts in the Chinese legal system. K.X.
LI & C.W.M. INGRAM, MARITIME LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA 22 (2002).
164
Id. at 22-23.
165
Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 242.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Murray, supra note 162, at 122.
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Within the maritime court system there is also a powerful arbitration body.
The maritime judges are empowered to compel and oversee maritime
arbitrations.169
Drawing from each of these examples, China can develop a court akin
to the NZEC that fits within China’s existing legal regime. The concept of
using technically-oriented laypersons accords with the Chinese tradition of
laypersons’ participation in judicial decision-making, and could even
improve the quality of decision-making by requiring technical expertise.170
By adopting a preference for judges who have some relevant knowledge or
experience in addition to legal comprehension, China would focus its
environmental talent on environmental needs and develop a knowledgeable
judiciary.
The NZEC’s small size makes direct implementation of a similar
structure in China impossible. China’s large geographical and political size
would require multiple specialized courts spread across the country. Like
the maritime courts, the environment courts could be located without
reference to the smaller political boundaries that the general courts follow.
The maritime courts are located in relevant areas: port cities.171 Similarly,
the environment courts should be located in areas of particular
environmental importance and concern. The country’s immensity generates
numerous areas that would benefit from a specialized court. For example,
courts could be located in larger cities—such as Beijing—that have rampant
air pollution, in cities in the Northern provinces where desertification is
quickly conquering the land, and near major waterways where water quality
issues arise often.
Such specialized courts would accept the responsibility of overseeing
both trial and appellate cases. The basic structure of the Chinese
Environmental Court would have to follow the general structure of all
Chinese courts, which are internally divided into various substantive and
169

Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 243.
Historically, judges in the people’s courts were not required to hold law degrees. China has
recently strengthened the qualification requirements to be a judge, so that the level of education required is
a bachelor’s degree in law or a bachelor’s degree in some other subject combined with knowledge of law.
See Judges Law ch. 4 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, June 30, 2001, effective July, 1,
1995) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) (amending the 1995 Judge’s Law); see also
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 291 (2002). Thus, people with
relevant environmental knowledge and training could become judges by gathering legal knowledge in their
other studies. Id.
171
See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Establishment
of Maritime Courts in Coastal Port Cities (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Nov. 14, 1984,
effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.); see also Pew,
Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 241.
170
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administrative divisions.172 Adhering to the structure of all Chinese courts,
the environmental court would be divided up by different substantive
divisions, including an appellate division,173 a civil division,174 and a
criminal division.175 The administrative divisions would include a research
office, a supervision office, a planning and finance section, and a political
department.176 Akin to both the NZEC and the maritime courts, a Chinese
Environmental Court should have a mediation and arbitration section. This
is an important component of all dispute resolution in China, and it would
likely increase the efficiency and use of an environmental court.177 That
there are a large number of different divisions and sections of the court may
raise concerns that the environmental court system would be quite large and
unwieldy. However, these various divisions are present in all Chinese
courts; installing another unique court system with the same fundamental
design should not prove especially difficult.
B.

To Accommodate Traditional Chinese Understanding of the
Judiciary’s Role, the Scope of the Chinese Environmental Court’s
Authority Should be a Modified Version of the NZEC’s Authority

In New Zealand, the Environment Court has the authority to hear all
cases brought under the RMA and some issues regulated by other statutes
related to environmental and planning issues.178 The NZEC exercises
authority under the RMA in three realms. First, it has the power to interpret
the law through declarations.179 Second, it has the power to review de novo
local government authorities’ decisions when those decisions are brought to

172

PEERENBOOM, supra note 170, at 283.
The appellate division within the environmental court would simply hear appeals from
administrative decisions. Appeals from environmental court decisions would be brought before the
Supreme Court in the relevant province, as maritime court appeals are brought. See LI & INGRAM, supra
note 163, at 22-23.
174
The civil divisions could be divided into core environmental categories, such as water, air, and
forests.
175
While China’s maritime courts do not have jurisdiction over criminal cases, at least two of China’s
other special courts—the military court and the railway and transport court—have jurisdiction over
criminal cases. Zhu Guobin, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 31, 61-62 (Wang
Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997).
176
See PEERENBOOM, supra note 170, at 284.
177
For more on judicial mediation, see Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52.
178
New
Zealand
Environment
Court,
How
Cases
Come
to
Court,
http://www.justice.govt.nz/environment/about/how-cases-court.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). The NZEC
has jurisdiction over other statutes, including: Historic Places Act, Forests Act, Local Government Act,
Transit New Zealand Act, Electricity Act, Crown Minerals Act, Maori Commercial Aquaculture Claim
Settlement Act, Biosecurity Act, and Public Works Act. Id.
179
RMA §§ 310-313; see also Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 28-30.
173
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the NZEC by reference or appeal.180 Lastly, the NZEC has the authority to
enforce the RMA’s requirements through civil or criminal proceedings.181
The power to make declarations regarding “[t]he existence or extent
of any function, power, right, or duty” under the RMA is a powerful tool.182
The Environment Court is empowered to engage in fairly “sweeping and
intensive environmental policymaking.”183 When combined with the power
to review decisions by regional and territorial authorities, this power of
declaration allows the NZEC to review generally the policy statements and
policy decisions of the various levels of government, excluding national
policy statements.184 The NZEC has the authority to review other decisions
of government authorities, such as decisions on applications for resource
consents.185 The Court also can issue enforcement orders under the RMA,186
and this ability is far-reaching and powerful.187
The Chinese maritime courts’ authority is seemingly limited by the
practical nature of the specialty area. Their authority appears to be limited
mainly to reviewing de novo disputes between various parties.188 These
courts appear to handle contract disputes primarily,189 and do not delve into
180

See Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 28, 30-31.
See id. at 28, 31-32.
182
RMA § 310(a).
183
See Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 39. Environment Court decisions can be appealed to the
High Court, but review by the High Court is limited to points of law. The High Court itself recognizes that
it lacks the expertise and background to address the matters of policy that drive environmental decisionmaking in the Environment Court: “[T]he role of this Court is not to delve into questions of planning and
resource management. That is for the expert [Environment Court] to determine based on its knowledge
gained from its day-to-day experience and its consideration of district and regional plans and submissions
made to it.” Id. at 38 (citing Stark v. Auckland Reg’l Council, [1994] N.Z.R.M.A. 337, 340).
184
See Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 29; Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 19-20. Of the major
policy statements, only the national policy statements are unreviewable by the Environment Court.
Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 30.
185
Id. at 30-31. Applications for resource consents are essentially an application for land use, and a
resource consent must be obtained for most development and other land use activities. See Ministry for the
Environment,
Setting
the
Scene:
Resource
Consents,
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/everyday/consent-submission-jun06/html/page3.html (last visited
April 17, 2008). The NZEC is afforded de novo review of these proceedings. See RMA § 276; see also
Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 30-31.
186
RMA §§ 314-321. These enforcement orders may, among other things, 1) enjoin a person from
acting in a manner that contravenes the RMA or other regulations, rules, or orders; 2) enjoin a person from
acting in a manner that is likely to be objectionable or to have an adverse impact on the environment;
3) require a person to act affirmatively to ensure compliance with the RMA or to avoid, remedy, or mitigate
adverse effects on the environment; and 4) require a person to compensate others for the reasonable costs
associated with avoiding, remedying, or mitigating adverse effects on the environment caused by that
person. RMA § 314. There are many other actions the NZEC may require through enforcement actions.
See id.
187
Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 32.
188
See generally Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at appendices.
189
See id. at 245-50 (three of the four cases that the authors describe are contract disputes, the fourth
is seemingly a tort issue involving financial injury from an anchor severing an underwater electric cable);
181
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policy or constitutional issues to resolve those disputes. The maritime courts
have the authority to embark on investigations of cases, including requesting
evidence that the court believes is necessary for the determination of the
action.190 The maritime courts also are granted the authority to issue
injunctions; this power allows a maritime court to order someone to do or
refrain from doing something in order to prevent infringement of the
legitimate rights and interests of another.191
Chinese courts of second instance can review lower courts’ decisions
and administrative actions with the discretion to investigate and conduct a
new hearing.192 Thus, one aspect of the NZEC and the maritime courts that
should remain in effect in the Chinese Environment Court is the authority to
review cases de novo. Understanding the centralized nature of Chinese
political decision-making, the court would not be granted the legal authority
to make broad declarations of law.193 Furthermore, review cannot be granted
over administrative decisions, as such review is precluded by China’s
Administrative Procedure Law.194
see generally Detailed Regulations Governing Maritime Litigation Involving Foreigners art. III
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 31, 1986, effective on date of promulgation)
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Maritime Litigation Involving Foreigners
Regulations].
190
See Civil Procedure Law ch. 6 art. 64 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Oct. 28,
2007, effective Apr. 9, 1991) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Civil
Procedure Law] (“For the evidence that cannot be obtained by any parties or their litigation representatives
because of some realistic reasons or for the evidence that the people’s court considers necessary for
adjudicating the case, the people’s court shall investigate and collect such evidence”); id. art. 65 (“The
people’s court shall have the authority to obtain evidence from any relevant units or individuals, and such
units or individuals may not refuse to provide evidence”). Interestingly, the maritime courts also have the
authority to arrest vessels, but this authority does not seem to have any importance in a specialized
environmental court, as the factories that are polluting seem unlikely to just float away before the cases are
decided. See Pew, note 148, at 243-44, Appendix D at 266-71.
191
LI & INGRAM, supra note 163, at 35.
192
See A Brief Introduction to China, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.asp (last visited
Apr. 17, 2008) (“Cases of second instance are often reviewed de novo as to both law and facts.”); Civil
Procedure Law ch. 14 art. 152 (establishing that people’s courts of second instance should verify the facts
“by consulting the file, making necessary investigations, and questioning the parties”). Having the
authority to collect evidence is especially important in environmental pollution cases, because the plaintiffs
do not often have the financial resources or knowledge to collect and analyze pollution samples.
193
The Supreme People’s Court may in reality be able to exercise this type of authority regardless of
the constitutional provision. Since the NPC and the Standing Committee have not exercised their authority
to construe the laws and enforce the Constitution, the Supreme People’s Court has been left free to interpret
laws even in the absence of a lawsuit. XIAN FA, art. 67; see also M. Ulric Killion, Post-WTO China and
Independent Judicial Review, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 507, 530, 536 (2004).
194
See Administrative Procedure Law ch. II, art. 12 (promulgated by the National People’s Congress,
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.). This law is also
known as the Administrative Litigation Law. The law prohibits courts from reviewing abstract
administrative actions which have general applicability, restricting court review to “concrete administrative
actions.” Song Bing, Assessing China’s System of Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, 8 CHINA L.
REP. 1 (1994-1999).
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The NZEC’s and the Maritime Courts’ Jurisdictional Reach Should Be
the Model for a Chinese Environmental Court

The NZEC is an expert tribunal that primarily addresses public
interest questions related to resource management and environmental law.195
The NZEC exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of the RMA and some
aspects of other statutes. It has the same status and powers in exercising its
jurisdiction as a District Court,196 but is “not bound by the usual procedural
and evidentiary formalities of other courts of law.”197 Rather, the
Environment Court establishes its own rules of conduct and evidence.198
China’s maritime courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any
maritime matter.199 The rules for the maritime courts expressly designate the
types of cases that the maritime courts are authorized to handle.200 The
maritime courts are permitted to “hear appeals from maritime administrative
decisions, fines, and rulings,”201 but do not have any jurisdiction over
criminal proceedings.202 Interestingly, the maritime courts are granted
express jurisdiction to hear cases involving marine pollution, such as
discharge of oil or hazardous wastes.203 This overlap with a potential
environmental court would have to be resolved by the NPC upon the
creation of a specialized environmental court. The maritime courts have
international jurisdiction, in order to hear cases involving foreign parties or
elements.204 Each court’s territorial jurisdiction is based on geographical
location.205
China’s specialized environmental courts should assume jurisdiction
over questions of natural resource and environmental law. Beyond that
critical resemblance to the NZEC, however, the jurisdiction granted to
195

Daya-Winterbottom, supra note 138, at 121.
RMA § 278.
197
Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 28; see also RMA § 276(2).
198
Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 18.
199
LI & INGRAM, supra note 163, at 23.
200
See Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Scope of Cases to be Entertained by
Maritime Courts (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Sept. 11, 2001, effective Sept. 18, 2001)
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.).
201
Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 243.
202
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of
Maritime Courts in Coastal Port Cities § 3 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Nov. 14,
1984, effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.).
203
See Decision of the Supreme People’s Court with Respect to Certain Questions on the
Establishment of Maritime Courts § 3(3) (P.R.C.), translated in Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at
258-59 (Appendix B) [hereinafter Supreme People’s Court, Maritime Courts]; see also Maritime Litigation
Involving Foreigners Regulations art. III.
204
LI & INGRAM, supra note 163, at 23.
205
See Supreme People’s Court Decision, Establishment of Maritime Courts § 4 (P.R.C.), translated
in Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 259-60 (Appendix B).
196
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China’s environmental courts would have to be modified. While the NZEC
has jurisdiction over all cases and controversies arising primarily under one
statute, China’s environmental laws are not so consolidated.206 Either the
Chinese specialized court should have express jurisdiction over the many
specific environmental statutes and administrative regulations, or the types
of disputes the court could hear should be specifically enumerated, much
like China’s maritime courts.207
To concentrate all environmental matters in one court, China’s
environmental courts should be empowered to hear both civil and criminal
cases. While the maritime courts are not given authority to hear criminal
cases, the NZEC does have such power. Criminal jurisdiction would be
necessary for a Chinese Environmental Court because it would force all
disputes involving environmental issues to be heard by one court, which
would provide consistency in decision-making and also would allow citizens
to better understand the court’s purview.
Specifically, a Chinese
Environmental Court should have authority to hear those cases the State
brings against Chinese officials for failing to enforce environmental
statutes.208 These types of cases are likely to involve complicated
environmental statutes, and it would provide the court with the ability to
oversee this critical aspect of environmental problems.
D.

The Standing Requirements for the NZEC Should be Modified to
Follow Chinese Law

The standing requirements for a specialized court in China will
necessarily have to be different than the NZEC’s very open standing rules.
The RMA gives any person standing to sue who participated in a
government decision.209 In China, public participation in the creation of
206

See supra note 76 for a long list of environmental laws through 2003.
The second option would more likely prevent confusion and unnecessary statutory changes when
new environmental laws are adopted, because the types of disputes, and not specific statutes, would qualify
the cases that the environmental court would hear.
208
As an example of a criminal case brought by the State against government officials, in 2002, “the
director and vice director of a county-level EPB in Shanxi Province were sentenced to prison for six and
eight months, respectively, for failing to stop a chemical plant from discharging toxic waste into the
drinking water system of a local village.” ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 114-15.
Having these suits proceed in an environmentally focused tribunal may provide a greater incentive for
officials to follow and enforce environmental laws.
209
Participation merely means commenting on a potential rule, action, or other decision, such as
making a submission to a council. See Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 10. In addition, a person has
standing to sue if she or he is affected by the decision or represents some relevant aspect of the public
interest. Id. Also, any person may request that the NZEC initiate proceedings regarding a criminal offense
committed under the RMA. Id.
207
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rules and regulations is extremely limited.210 The standing requirements in a
Chinese specialized environmental court must comply with Chinese law.
Only those individual citizens or organizations whose legal rights and
interest have been directly affected by another’s activities have standing to
bring a lawsuit.211
In sum, a Chinese Environment Court would share much in common
with the NZEC. Like the NZEC it would have jurisdiction over all
environmental matters and it would have a similar structure to the NZEC.
But a specialized court would need to fit within the existing Chinese legal
system; it would therefore differ from the NZEC in its standing requirements
and it would have more limited authority than the NZEC. Overall, these
proposed aspects of a Chinese Environment Court would create a tribunal
addressing environmental matters, which are often complicated and
contentious. A specialized court would provide a forum for Chinese citizens
to redress injuries to their health and environment. While it is daunting to
fashion a specialized court for an issue of such importance, it is possible to
learn from what has been done already and use that knowledge to create a
unique and successful institution.
VI.

A SPECIALIZED ENVIRONMENTAL COURT WOULD PROMOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN CHINA

Specialized courts create experts in a specific field, and allow for
consistency and uniformity in decisions. Each of these benefits could help
stabilize the Chinese legal system and promote investment in China’s
economy. One commentator concluded that the use of a specialized and
expert tribunal increases public confidence in that court’s determinations;
improves efficiency of environmental litigation, particularly because
“[r]elatively less time (and expense) is necessary to reliably inform the Court
about the issues it is adjudicating”; and contributes to environmentally sound
decision-making.212 Another scholar found that specialization increases
expertise, which is beneficial because expertise provides more ability to
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understand and interpret complex legislation.213 Specialization may also
improve consistency, which allows for greater predictability214 and has the
potential to enhance efficiency.215 Moreover, specialization may have a
positive impact on public opinion.216 Expertise is improved in a specialized
court both through initial appointments and continued education. The
creation of a specialized unit makes it more feasible to hire staff composed
at least partly of specialists, and expertise continues to develop as a result of
repetition in subject matter.217
The positive impact on public opinion and greater predictability both
offer the Chinese government a reason to adopt a specialized court. Both of
these effects could draw further economic investment from foreign
corporations into the country.218 More predictable and effective enforcement
of existing environmental laws also has the potential to increase the appeal
of using clean technology.219
Having a special litigation forum where Chinese citizens can voice
their concerns might ultimately improve the environmental protection
system overall. One scholar noted three benefits that increased litigation
213
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could offer China: improved environmental law-making,220 increased public
awareness,221 and pressure on polluting industries.222 While these positive
impacts of litigation have the potential to occur in the current Chinese legal
system, these impacts would likely be amplified by the existence of an
environmental court. A specialized tribunal will likely increase the amount
of environmental litigation. This will occur because public awareness about
environmental litigation will be raised by media attention to this new court
and because citizens will likely feel that they will have more success in a
court that specializes in understanding environmental laws and science.
Ideally, the existence of a special forum for bringing environmental disputes
should raise citizen awareness about environmental problems and about
litigation as a dispute resolution tool.
VII. CONCLUSION
China has dealt itself a bad environmental hand. To continue playing
it is a losing proposition, with assured catastrophic consequences to the
Chinese people. The struggle to establish the rule of law as the final arbiter
of environmental conflicts must begin with a credible legal process that
offers participants and the public an impartial, efficient, and enforceable
result. Without question, many changes must occur within the legal system
in order to accomplish this goal;223 however, these barriers should not delay
the establishment of a specialized environmental court. The success of the
NZEC provides a model that can be modified to address the particular
sensitivities of China’s culture and political system. China must alter its
220
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course in order to protect the country’s important natural resources and to
make the country a healthy place for its citizens. Adopting a specialized
court will stimulate the country’s potentially powerful environmental
regulatory framework. The specific aspects of this specialized court could
be developed through modification of China’s maritime courts and the
NZEC.
Providing a new forum for environmental disputes will focus the
country’s energy, which has long been used for economic growth and
development, to create innovative solutions to China’s environmental
problems. In addition, an environmental court may inspire world leaders to
assist China in solving the country’s environmental difficulties; other
countries and multi-national corporations could provide technology and
knowledge to support China’s movement towards environmental
sustainability. China must provide some signal to others that it is willing
and able to correct the country’s environmental devastation; creating a
special court could be just the indication necessary. It is important for China
to find a balance between economic viability and environmental
sustainability, and creating an environment court is one step on the path to
this equilibrium.

